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Abstract—We consider a network that comprises a group of
K users, equipped with single-antenna terminals, who want
to selfishly maximize their individual transmission rates and
S single-antenna base stations. The information rates and the
transmit power levels of the users are not dictated by the base
stations. In this context we introduce the problem of decentralized
handovers: each terminal is equipped with a cognitive radio used
to sense the quality of its links with the different base stations
and share, in a smart way, its transmit power among them. In
the hard handover case, for which there is a unique stable Nash
equilibrium, we determine the selfish repartition of the users
between the base stations and then we assess its social efficiency,
which is measured in terms of sum-rate. In the soft handover case,
the problem consists in determining the optimum selfish power
allocation for each user and analyzing its sum-rate efficiency
with respect to the equivalent virtual K × S multiple input
multiple output (MIMO) network. We also show how to extend
the provided results to the case of multi-antenna terminals and
base stations and provide simulations to illustrate the presented
results.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of decentralized or distributed wireless net-
works and the underlying problem of resource allocation has
been properly formalized for the first time by Goodman et
al. in [1] and [2]. The most simple decentralized channel
is the multiple access channel (MAC), which allows one to
describe the downlink of a cellular system with one base
station (BS) and several mobile stations (MS). The MAC
is said to be decentralized in the sense that a base station
does not dictate to the users connected to it, their information
rates and transmit power levels. Each user can choose freely
its power allocation policy in order to selfishly maximize
a certain individual performance criterion. In this paper we
consider a system of S orthogonal MACs. More precisely,
the system comprises S base stations using non-overlapping
bands of frequency and a group of K mobile stations. We also
assume that the base stations are connected through perfect
communication links. In UMTS networks for example, the
base stations are connected through a radio network controller
and very reliable wire connections (e.g. optic fibers), which are
not far from perfect communication links. The system under
investigation corresponds to the decentralized counterpart of
the system analyzed by [3][4] where the authors assessed the
benefits of cross-system diversity.
In this context we introduce and investigate the problem
of decentralized handover in cognitive networks i.e. we want
to know how free and selfish users would connect to the
different base stations. Each user is assumed to be interested in
maximizing its own transmission rate in the sense of Shannon.
If hard handover is imposed to the system, the task of a
given user is to decide which is the best base station for
him to be connected to, given the fact the BSs have different
characteristics. In this paper they differ by their reception
noise levels and numbers of served users (which correspond
to various multi-user interference levels) but they might also
differ by their numbers of antennas, bandwidths or any other
parameter likely to determine the transmission rate. On the
other hand, if soft handover is allowed, the task of a user
consists in optimally sharing its transmit power between the
base stations in presence. The reason why we assume the
mobile terminals to be equipped with a cognitive radio [5]
is that we want the users to be as independent of the base
stations as possible. Thanks to its cognitive radio each user can
sense its environment, evaluate the transmission rate associated
with a given route, and make the optimal decision in the
sense of his utility. Therefore the problem addressed in this
paper can be seen as a generalized version of the “car versus
public transportation” problem analyzed in [6] to the context
of wireless networks. In [6] the authors considered commuters
who want go from Berkeley to San Francisco. Commuters
can either drive over the Bay Bridge or take the BART (bay
area rapid transit) train. Each commuter acts selfishly and
chooses the route that minimizes his own transportation time.
Assuming reasonable functions for commuting time versus
number of users for the two routes, it is possible to show the
existence and uniqueness of a stable Nash equilibrium (NE)
for this game [6]. In our setup this situation corresponds to a
network with two base stations for which only hard handover
is allowed and a crowded route corresponds to a base station
with a high multiuser interference level.
This paper is structured as follows. In the first main part
(Sec. II) single-antenna terminals and Gaussian channels are
assumed. Both the hard and soft handover cases are treated.
For each of these cases the network sum-rate achieved by
using single-user decoding (SUD) or successive interference
cancelation (SIC) is evaluated and compared to the sum-rate of
the centralized counterpart of the system under investigation
(the latter corresponds to the sum-rate of the equivalent virtual
MIMO network), which allows us to measure the social
efficiency of the considered networks of selfish users. The
second main part (Sec. III) is intended to show to extend the
provided results to the case of fading channels with multi-
antenna terminals. Because of this and the lack of space, only
one scenario with multi-antenna terminals is detailed: the hard
handover case with single-user decoding.
II. NETWORKS OF SINGLE-ANTENNA TERMINALS WITH
STATIC LINKS
A. Signal model
The global system under investigation is represented in
Fig. 1. It consists of K mobile stations and S base stations
using non-overlapping bands of frequency (in Fig. 1, S = 3)
which are taken to be equal and normalized at 1 Hz. All
terminals have only one antenna. The equivalent baseband
signals received by base station s ∈ {1, ..., S} can be written
as
Ys =
K∑
k=1
hs,kXs,k + Zs (1)
where ∀k ∈ {1, ...,K}, ∀s ∈ {1, ..., S}, Xs,k is the signal
transmitted by user k to base station s, hs,k is the gain of
the corresponding channel, which is assumed to be constant
in this section, and Zs is a complex white Gaussian noise
distributed as N (0, Ns). Each user has a limited transmit
power: E|Xs,k|2 = αs,kP with
S∑
s=1
αs,k = 1 and αs,k ∈ {0, 1}
for the hard handover case and αsk ∈ [0, 1] for the soft
handover case. We assume that the mobile terminals have the
same transmit power, which is a reasonable assumption in most
wireless systems.
Fig. 1. A group of K free, selfish and cognitive users who want to connect to
one (hard handover case) or several (soft handover case) base stations having
non-overlapping bands of frequency.
At the receivers, we assume that the same decoding scheme
is used: either all base stations implement single-user decoding
or successive interference cancelation. The first decoding
scheme can be assumed, for instance, because the base station
has to be neutral in the game or/and for limiting the receiver
complexity. The second decoding scheme is more efficient
in terms of interference reduction but is intrinsically unfair.
In order for this decoding scheme to be fair from we will
introduce a coordination mechanism that allow each user to
see all decoding ranks instead of a single one.
B. Hard handover case
In this section the users can connect to only one base station
at a time. Each user chooses the best base station in the sense
of his utility function which is chosen to be the transmission
rate (the latter depends on the decoding scheme used at the
base stations). For this purpose each user knows the reception
noise level at each base station s and is able to sense its
multiuser interference level. In this section we will assume for
simplicity that the channel gains hsk = 1 for all (s, k). Let Ks
be the number of users in system s ∈ {1, ..., S}, and xs = KsK ,
the fraction of the users in system s, with
S∑
s=1
xs = 1. By
definition xs ∈ Q+ but for sufficiently high numbers of users
it is reasonable to assume that xs ∈ R+. Note that if there
was no interference all the users would connect to the base
station smin with Nsmin = min
s
{Ns} and therefore xs = 1
for s = smin and xs = 0 otherwise. Because of the multi-
user interference the users will choose another repartition in
general. The main issue we want to solve now is to determine
this repartition and evaluate its network sum-rate efficiency.
1) Single-user decoding: By assumption αsk ∈ {0, 1}.
Therefore the utility for user k in system s merely writes as:
u
(s)
k = log2
[
1 +
P
Ns + (Kxs − 1)P
]
. (2)
As the users are cognitive, they can sense their environment
and know what are their utilities at any time. If we consider
the dynamic game where the cognitive users have to choose
between the two base stations. It can be shown [6] that the
users are going to react as long as their utility in system s
is not equal to that in system j where j ∈ {1, ..., S}. This
observation - reaction process is going to converge to a stable
equilibrium point given by:
log2
[
1 +
P
Ns + (Kxs − 1)P
]
= log2
[
1 +
P
Nj + (Kxj − 1)P
]
(3)
Knowing also that
S∑
j=1
xj = 1 we obtain the repartition of the
selfish users:
x∗,SUDs =
1
S
+
1
S
S∑
j=1
Nj −Ns
KP
. (4)
Furthermore, the solution x∗s has to lie in [0, 1], for all
s ∈ {1, ...S}. In order to find the optimal distribution that
satisfies these constraints we propose the following recursive
algorithm:
1) Initialization: S = {1, ...S}
2) For all the BSs s ∈ S apply equation (4) and find x∗s;
3) If there exists a non empty subset S0 ⊂ S such that
x∗s < 0 for all s ∈ S0:
a) x∗s = 0 for all s ∈ S0;
b) Update: S = S \ S0 and S = |S|;
c) Return to step 2;
4) If there exists a non empty subset S1 ⊂ S such that
x∗s > 1 for all s ∈ S1:
a) x∗s = 0 for all s ∈ S \ S1;
b) Update: S = S1 and S = |S|
c) Return to step 2.
where |S| denotes the cardinal of the set S . Due to space
limitations we will not prove the existence and uniqueness
of the mentioned Nash equilibrium but this can be done by
calling Theorems 1 and 2 of [8].
Finally, the network sum-rate can be evaluated and is equal
to:
R∗,SUDsum =
S∑
s=1
Kx∗,SUDs log2
[
1 +
P
Ns + (Kx
∗,SUD
s − 1)P
]
.
(5)
2) Successive interference cancellation: When successive
interference cancellation is assumed, the base station s has
to decide in which order it decodes the Ks users. If these
choices are made once and for all, the game is unfair since the
users do not see the same amount of interference for a given
base station. In order to make the game fair we propose to
use the coordination mechanism introduced in [7] for MIMO
multiple access channels. Each base station s owns a random
source that generates a discrete signal with Ks! equiprobable
states. The realization of this random signal precisely indicates
in which order the users connected to the base station s are
decoded using a perfect successive interference canceller. The
base station discloses the realizations of this signal to all the
users. The frequency to which the realizations are drawn can
be chosen such that a certain degree of fairness is reached over
the duration of the transmission. In a real wireless system it
could be chosen to be roughly proportional to the inverse of
the channel coherence time. The utility for user k if it connects
to BS s is therefore:
u
(s)
k =
Ks∑
i=1
p
(s)
k (i) log2
[
1 +
P
Ns + (i− 1)P
]
(6)
where p(s)k (i) is the probability that user k is decoded with
rank i in system s. Knowing that the BS use a fair SIC we
have that p(s)k (i) =
1
Ks
for all i ∈ {1, ...,Ks} and the utility
function becomes:
u
(s)
k =
1
Kxs
log2
[
1 +
KxsP
Ns
]
. (7)
At the equilibrium we have that for a fixed s ∈ {1, ..., S},
∀j ∈ {1, ..., S}:
1
xs
log2
[
1 +
KxsP
Ns
]
=
1
xj
log2
[
1 +
KxjP
Nj
]
(8)
While the corresponding system of equations can be solved by
a simple numerical technique for S = 2, the problem is more
challenging for S > 2, for which the solution goes the scope
of this paper. At the equilibrium point, the sum rate obtained
in this case is:
R∗,SICsum =
S∑
s=1
log2
[
1 +
Kx∗,SICs P
Ns
]
. (9)
3) Full cooperation upper bound: Here we consider the
network to be centralized and express its sum-rate, which
correspond to the transmission rate of the equivalent K × S
virtual MIMO channel since the considered network consists
of S parallel (or orthogonal) MACs. For a given choice for
the fractions x1, ..., xS the network sum-rate writes:
RCsum =
S∑
s=1
log2
[
1 +
KxsP
Ns
]
. (10)
Although the coordination mechanism proposed for the case
of SIC is a priori suboptimal, we observe that the sum-rate
function for centralized case RCsum(xs) is exactly the same
as that for the decentralized case with SIC RSICsum(xs) but
the selfish behavior of the users will not lead, in general,
to the repartition maximizing this function RSICsum ≡ RCsum.
However, this observation shows the interest in using a pricing
mechanism to deviate the users from the spontaneous Nash
equilibrium into a stimulated one.
The optimal centralized network sum-rate when hard han-
dover is imposed is obtained by maximizing the following
Lagrangian:
L = −RCsum + λ
(
S∑
s=1
xs −K
)
. (11)
By setting the derivative ∂L∂xj to zero for all j ∈ {1, ...S}, we
obtain the following water-filling solution:
x∗,Cj =
1
K
[
1
λ
− Nj
P
]+
(12)
where the parameter λ ≥ 0 is tuned such that the power
constraints are met at the optimal point:
S∑
s=1
x∗,Cs = 1. It can
be checked that this repartition of users (eq. (12)) is the same
as for the decentralized network with single-user decoding (eq.
(4)).
C. Soft handover case
In this section αs,k is not imposed to belong to a binary set
(hard handover) but lies in [0, 1]. Also we assume from now
on that the channel gains hs,k can be arbitrary.
1) Single-user decoding: The utility (transmission rate) for
user k expresses now as:
uk =
S∑
s=1
log2
[
1 +
αs,kηsk
1 +
∑
6`=k αs,`ηs`
]
(13)
with ηs,k =
|hs,k|2P
Ns
. We introduce the constrained functions:
Lk = −uk + λk
(
S∑
s=1
αs,k − 1
)
. (14)
The optimal vector of (non-negative) fractions {αs,k}Ss=1 is
the solution of{
∂Lk
∂αs,k
= 0 , ∀k ∈ {1, ...,K}, s ∈ {1, ..., S}. (15)
The parameters λk ≥ 0 are tuned such that
S∑
s=1
α∗,SUDs,k = 1.
In order to better understand the nature of the problem to be
solved let us detail the case S = 2,K = 2. The optimal pair
of power fractions is the solution of the following system (KT
optimality conditions):
η11
1+η12(1−α2)+η11α1 −
η21
1+η22α2+η21(1−α1) + λ1 − λ2 = 0− η12
1+η12(1−α2)+η11α1 +
η22
1+η22α2+η21(1−α1) + λ3 − λ4 = 0
λ1(α1 − 1) = 0
λ2α1 = 0
λ3(α2 − 1) = 0
λ4α2 = 0.
(16)
Now we consider a particular regime for the channel gains to
show that the solution obtained is not always intuitive. Assume
that for λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, λ3 = 0 and λ4 = 0, the solution
of the previous system (α∗1, α
∗
2) is such that α
∗
1 ∈ [0, 1] and
therefore that the solution expresses as:
α∗1 =
η12 + η22 + η12η21 + η12η22
η11η22 − η12η21
α∗2 =
η11 + η21 + η11η21 + η12η21
η11η22 − η12η21 .
(17)
We see that this solution is not that easy to interpret in general.
Let us focus on the special case where user 1 has a dominant
link that is η11 >> η21. Then
α∗1 =
η12 + η22 + η12η21 + η12η22
η11
(
η22 − η12 η21η11
) (18)
' 1
η11
(
1 + η12 +
η12
η22
)
+
η21
η11
η12
η22
(19)
' 1
η11
(
1 + η12 +
η12
η22
)
. (20)
As a consequence if the link 11 is strong user 1 will allocate a
small fraction of his power to it and save it to allocate almost
all his power to the weak link. This situation is the contrary to
what happens with a water-filling type power allocation policy.
In fact user 1 will allocate more power to link 11 only when
user 2 generates a large amount of interference in its strongest
link. When η12 >> 1 we have
α∗1 ' min
{
η12
η11
, 1
}
. (21)
Thus for user 1 the fraction of power in system 1 is simply
the ratio of the interference level to the useful signal level.
2) Successive interference cancellation: We assume that
the base stations use the same fair SIC decoding technique
as described for the hard handover case. The only difference
here is that all the users can be connected to all the base
stations S at the same time. The utility for user k is:
uk =
S∑
s=1
1
K
K∑
i=1
 1(K−1i−1 )
∑
J
(i−1)
k
log2
1 + ηskαk(s)1 + ∑
l∈J(i−1)
k
ηslαl(s)


(22)
where J (i−1)k = {I ⊂ {1, ...,K} − {k}, such that: |I| = i− 1}.
We introduce the Lagrange function:
Lk = −uk + λk
(
S∑
s=1
αk(s)− 1
)
(23)
The equilibrium in this case is the solution of:{
∂Lk
∂αk(s)
= 0 ∀k ∈ {1, ...,K}, s ∈ {1, ..., S} (24)
The parameters λk ≥ 0 are tuned such that
∑S
s=1 α
∗,SIC
k = 1.
Always for the purpose of identifying the nature of the
mathematical problem to be solved we restrict our attention
to the case where S = 2 and K = 2. In this case the
optimal allocation point (α∗,SIC1 , α
∗,SIC
2 ) is the solution to
the following system:
η11
1+η11α1
+ η11
1+η12(1−α2)+η11α1−− η21
1+η21(1−α1) −
η21
1+η22α2+η21(1−α1) + 2λ1 − 2λ2 = 0− η12
1+η12(1−α2)+η11α1 −
η12
1+η12(1−α2)+
+ η22
1+η22α2
+ η22
1+η22α2+η21(1−α1) + 2λ3 − 2λ4 = 0
λ1(α1 − 1) = 0
λ2α1 = 0
λ3(α2 − 1) = 0
λ4α2 = 0
(25)
3) Full cooperation upper bound: For an arbitrary number
of users in system s, Ks the network sum-rate writes:
RCsum =
S∑
s=1
log2
[
1 +
Ks∑
k=1
ηskαs,k
]
, (26)
which is optimized by introducing the following constrained
sum-rate function:
L = −RCsum + λk
(
S∑
s=1
αs,k − 1
)
. (27)
Like the hard handover case two observations can be made:
RSICsum(αs,k) = R
C
sum(αs,k) and α
∗,C
s,k = α
∗,SUD
s,k . The first
observation always indicates the potential of a pricing mecha-
nism in our context. Simulations will help us to assess the gap
between the performance of the centralized and decentralized
networks and quantify this potential. The second observation
shows that the selfish power allocation when SUD is assumed
at the base stations is the same as in a cooperative network
with an optimal decoding scheme.
III. HARD HANDOVER IN NETWORKS OF MULTI-ANTENNA
TERMINALS WITH FADING LINKS
In the previous section we have assumed static channels and
single-antenna terminals. Our approach can be extended to the
more attractive scenario where fading channels and multiple
antennas are assumed. Because of space limitation we will
only detail one case, which is the hard handover case with
single-user decoding. The equivalent baseband signal received
by BS s ∈ {1, ..., S} is now given by:
Y s(τ) =
K∑
k=1
Hs,kXs,k(τ) + Zs(τ) (28)
where ∀k ∈ {1, ...,K}, ∀s ∈ {1, ..., S}, Xs,k(τ) is the
signal transmitted by user k to base station s at time τ ,
Hs,k(τ) ∈ Cnr×nt is the channel matrix associated with
user k for the system s (stationary and ergodic process),
nr the number of receive antennas (the same for all base
stations), nt the number of transmit antennas (the same for all
users), Zs(τ) is an nr-dimensional complex white Gaussian
noise distributed as N (0, n0BsI), where n0 is the receive
noise power spectral density, Bs the bandwidth of system
s and ρs is the corresponding signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
We denote by Ns = n0Bs. For simplicity we will omit the
time index τ from our notations. Each user has a limited
transmit power:
S∑
s=1
E|Xs,k|2 ≤ 1. In our analysis the flat
fading channel vectors of the different links can possibly vary
from symbol vector (or space-time codeword) to symbol vector
(or space-time codeword). We assume that the receivers (base
stations) know their channel matrix (coherent communication
assumption) and send the information through reliable links
to a central controller.
For simplicity we assume that S = 2 and also that
there is neither transmit spatial correlation nor receive spatial
correlation. The input covariance matrix for user k in system
1 is of the form Q1k = α1kP I with αk ∈ {0, 1}. Also
Q2k = αkP I. Assuming the asymptotic regime in terms
of the number of antennas: nt −→ ∞, nr −→ ∞, and
lim
nt→∞,nr→∞
nt
nr
= c <∞ and by exploiting Theorem 3.7 of
[9] we find that the approximated transmission rate per receive
antenna for user k when he puts all his power in system 1
writes
u
(1)
k = nr[Kx1c log2(1 +Kx1ρ1Pγ1k)− log2(Kx1cγ1k) +
+Kx1cγ1k log2 e−Kx′1c log2(1 +Kx′1ρ1Pγ′1k) +
+ log2(Kx
′
1cγ
′
1k)−Kx′1cγ′1k log2 e]
with 
γ1k =
1
Kx1c
1
1 +Kx1ρ1δ1k
δ1k =
P
1 +Kx1ρ1Pγ1k
,
(29)

γ′1k =
1
Kx′1c
1
1 +Kx′1ρ1δ
′
1k
δ′1k =
P
1 +Kx′1ρ1Pγ
′
1k
(30)
and x′1 = x1 − 1K , limnt→∞,nr→∞
nt
nr
= c <∞, ρ1 = 1N1 . As
γ1k and γ′1k are functions of K1, the utility of user k in system
1 can be written as u(1)k = φ1(K1) and u
(2)
k = φ2(K1) in
system 2. The determination of the repartition of the users
can therefore be determined.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
For S = 2, N1 = 1, N2 = 10, P = 10 and K = 20, Fig.
2 shows the network sum-rate as a function of the fraction of
users x1 in base station 1 when hard handover is assumed. The
bottom curve corresponds to the scenario where single-user
decoding is assumed, whereas the two top curves coincide and
correspond to the centralized and SIC-based scenarios. For the
SUD scheme the spontaneous user repartition in BS 1 is about
0.5 while it exists a better repartition which would provide a
sum-rate close to 5 bit/s instead of 3 bit/s, which shows the
potential of a pricing mechanism when SUD is used at the
base stations. On the other hand, when SIC is assumed the
optimal selfish repartition is about 0.75 and the corresponding
sum-rate is quite close to the optimum sum-rate obtained with
x1 = 0.52. Pricing is apparently less promising when SIC is
implemented.
Now consider the case of soft handover. The simulation
setup for Fig. 3 is: S = 2, K = 2, N1 = N2 = 1, h11 = 1,
h21 = 2, h12 = 4, h22 = 3. This figure represents the sum-
rate versus the MS transmit power. Interestingly the sum-rate
achieved by a decentralized network using SIC is close to that
of a centralized network, which has been confirmed in many
other simulation setups. This is a good news in the sense
that intelligence can be transferred from the base station to
the mobile stations and it shows the potential for reducing
the overhead due to the network signalling and control. This
also shows that the sub-optimal fair coordination mechanism
proposed is sum-rate efficient. Another observation we made
is that, in some scenarios, a selfish network using SUD can
perform better than a selfish network using SIC. This can be
proved analytically. This happens when the following condi-
tions are met: − η111+η12 +
η21
1+η21
≥ 0 and η121+η12 −
η22
1+η21
≥ 0. In
this region of R4, the selfish users optimal power allocation
when the BSs use SUD, is α∗1 = 0 and α
∗
2 = 0. The users
use only one base station and their selfish behavior results in
an interference-free system having a better sum-rate than that
obtained by using SIC at the BSs.
At last, in Fig. 4, we have studied the case where mutiple
antenna terminals are considered, and for which the channels
are no longer static but time varying ones. The setup is: S = 2,
K = 20, N1 = 1, N2 = 10, nr = nt = 4. The decoding
scheme used by the base stations single user decoding. The
equilibrium corresponds to the crossing point between utility
for user 1 and utility for user 2. In the chosen setup the user
repartition is quite uniform since x∗1 = 0.525. This repartition
occurs when the multi-user interference strongly dominates
the noise. Then the BS reception noise level is no longer a
discriminating characteristic for the base station.
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Fig. 2. Achievable sum rate versus user fraction in base station 1. As-
sumptions: hard handover, AWGN channels, single antenna terminals. Setup:
S = 2, K = 20, P = 10, N1 = 1, N2 = 10.
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Fig. 3. Achievable sum rate versus MS transmit power. Assumptions: soft
handover, AWGN channels, single antenna terminals. Setup: S = 2, K = 2,
N1 = N2 = 1, h11 = 1, h21 = 2, h12 = 4, h22 = 3.
V. EXTENSIONS
In the case of decentralized networks with cognitive termi-
nals with hard handover the notion of preference has to be
extended. In this paper a selfish user discriminates the base
stations by their reception noise and multi-user interference
levels. It would also be useful to analyze networks where
BS have different bandwidths, numbers of antennas, spreading
factors or any parameters influential on the user’s utility (the
transmission rate in this paper). We also saw the potential
of devising a pricing mechanism in networks with hard han-
dover, especially when single-user decoding is assumed at the
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Fig. 4. User utilities versus user fraction in base station 1. Assumptions: hard
handover, fading channels, multi-antenna terminals. Setup: S = 2, K = 20,
N1 = 1, N2 = 10, nr = nt = 4.
BSs. When SIC is assumed, the optimality of the proposed
coordination mechanism should be assessed in order to know
whether it is always sum-rate efficient. Also it is important
to assess the performance improvement due to soft handover
over hard handover in decentralized networks, which will be
done in future work.
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